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One of the most pressing international environmental issues today is 
how to allocate the burden of achieving carbon reductions among nations. 
One superficially appealing approach—adopted in part by the Kyoto Protocol 
and the EU’s European Trading System—is to require that each nation reduce 
its aggregate annual emissions by an equal percentage.  Other approaches, 
including the one adopted in later phases of the European Trading System, 
require reductions in emissions according to the relative wealth of each 
nation.  Still other approaches that have been discussed include requiring each 
nation to reduce per capita (as opposed to aggregate) emissions by an equal 
percentage. 
None of these approaches, however, has provided a workable system of 
emissions reductions that appears capable of garnering worldwide acceptance.  
In this Article we explore another option, one roughly modeled on the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency’s Clean Power Rule.  In 
the proposed Clean Power Rule, EPA was required to allocate the burden 
of reducing carbon emissions from electricity production among the States.  
EPA chose a novel approach that is quite different from that adopted 
in Kyoto or the EU—what we call a “Switching Costs” approach.  Under this 
approach, each State is allocated reduction percentages in emissions rates 
or mass emissions that depend heavily on the State’s switching opportunities— 
its opportunities to switch from coal to natural gas and from fossil-fuel 
energy sources to renewable energy.  In states in which switching opportunities 
are relatively abundant, and hence transition costs relatively low, higher 
percentage reductions in emission rates per megawatt or mass emissions 
are required.  One result is that increases in electricity rates in the State 
should be more similar, closer to equal, than they would be under an approach 
that required emissions reductions without regard to variations in the switching 
opportunities available to each State. Thus, as Bob Sussman reported, 
EPA’s analysis of its proposed Rule’s effects on rates in twenty different 
regions within the United States suggested that rates will “vary somewhat” 
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but “these variations are fairly small, generally within 2 percent below 
or above the national average in 20301 
The final EPA rule seems to limit the range in state targets and perhaps 
reduce the extent of variation in state targets based on the differences 
in switching opportunities available to each state.  For example, Arizona, which 
has readily available solar alternatives, faced a much higher target under the 
proposed plan than the final rule. On the other hand, Kentucky, which is 
coal-dependent and has little in the way of an infrastructure to allow  a ready 
shift to natural gas or renewables, faced a much lower target under the 
proposed plan than under the final rule.  Moreover, EPA does not appear 
to have released an analysis of how much the final rule, as opposed to the 
proposed one, will affect electricity rates in different regions of the United 
States; EPA seems to suggest that the final rule has so much flexibility 
built into it that costs cannot be predicted on a state-by-state basis.  It is 
possible that there will be more substantial variation in ratepayer costs across 
the country as a result of the EPA final rule than under the proposed rule. 
Nonetheless, we can use the EPA Rule as an approach to allocation of 
carbon reductions among the member states or nations to a multilateral 
agreement that is based on the relative availability and hence relative costs 
to each participant of switching from a high-emission fossil fuel to a 
lower-emission one and/or switching power production to renewable 
sources.  Nations for whom switching would be relatively less expensive 
would be required to reduce emissions more (either in terms of the emissions 
rate per megawatt or in terms of mass emissions) than nations for whom 
switching would be relatively more expensive.  Focusing on the availability 
of switching opportunities and hence the costs of emission reductions to 
ratepayers as the measure for what constitutes an “equal” or “fair” burden 
among states or nations has several normative and political feasibility 
advantages over other approaches.  Just as when a group of diners agree to 
split a bill for a large dinner in which each diner ordered different items 
with somewhat different prices and each diner has a different economic 
situation, allocation emissions reductions based on an equal ratepayer costs 
or something close to it avoids normatively intractable arguments about 
how much each state or nations’ population is ethically responsible for 
1. Bob Sussman, Debating the EPA’s Clean Power Plan Proposal—EPA’s State
Goals for Reducing Carbon Pollution from Power Plants: A Thoughtful and Fair Solution, 
BROOKINGS: THE PLANET POLICY (Aug. 18, 2014, 2:00 PM), http://www.brookings.edu/ 
blogs/planetpolicy/posts/2014/08/18-debating-epa-clean-power-proposal. 
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its historic emissions (as opposed to current ones) and how much differences 
in wealth should translate into differences in ethical obligations with regard 
to efforts to address common problem.  Everyone puts in roughly the same 
amount to the pot.  And because as a political reality those states or nations 
that have relatively few switching opportunities and hence relatively high 
switching costs are likely to be much more politically resistant to ambitious 
emissions targets than those that have ample switching opportunities and 
relatively low switching costs, this approach may be more politically 
acceptable than those that have been tried to date. 
However, one potential downside is that the switching opportunities 
approach may create a disincentive for a state (or nation) to create more 
opportunities for transitioning to low- or zero-emission power sources, 
because such efforts could result in the state (or nation) being allocated a 
higher emission reductions target in the next round of targets, which, if 
nothing else, reduces its flexibility as to future energy-related and economic 
decisions.  Switching costs are in part the product of factors outside of direct 
political control—how much sun or wind that is available to a given jurisdiction 
is in part a product of geography—but they are also a product of political 
decisions regarding public investments and incentives for private investments 
in energy production infrastructure. There are, however, ways to deal with 
such disincentives that make the switching opportunities approach a promising 
model for international accords.  Indeed, EPA took a step in this direction 
in the Final Rule by offering credit awards to states that quickly create 
renewable generation capacity. 
Allocations of emissions reductions (either in terms of rate per megawatt 
or by mass) in terms of switching opportunities and switching costs might be 
a less appealing and less compelling idea in a regime in which there is 
highly effective tradable-permit or carbon tax regime.  In an ideal tradable 
permit regime and an ideal carbon tax regime, we would expect to see 
the largest reductions in emissions in places in which the costs of reducing 
carbon emissions by whatever means are available are lowest, and that 
would imply that, at least among otherwise similar jurisdictions (notably, 
jurisdictions with comparable efficiency levels at emitting facilities and 
comparable demand-side conservation or efficiency), we would expect 
to see greater reductions in those where switching costs were relatively low. 
However, the transaction costs and political economy problems surrounding 
CO2 cap-and-trade regimes have been much discussed, as have the institutional 
design and political feasibility problems of carbon taxes. In the United 
States, for example, any hint of an explicit carbon tax has been disavowed 
by political leaders, and Australia recently repealed its carbon tax.  It 
may well be that an agreement based on a switching-costs-sensitive initial 
allocation of emissions reduction obligations could have the political traction 
to actually be adopted, and, once adopted, trading and taxing carbon could 
BARSA-DANA (DO NOT DELETE) 8/8/2016 3:09 PM 
[VOL. 7:  1, 2015–16] A Switching Costs Approach 
SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 
5 
be added as an overlay to further reduce costs of emissions reductions. 
But even so, beginning with a switching-cost-sensitive allocation may 
be necessary to move to a workable trading or tax regime. In this account, 
a switching-costs-sensitive-allocation is the second-best regime that may 
allow for the realization of the first-best regime. 
In Part I, this paper reviews the allocation plans that have been tried 
so far on an international scale and why they have not succeeded.  In Part 
II, the paper explains EPA’s Clean Power Rule and what we are calling the 
switching opportunities approach that is at least roughly suggested by 
the Rule.  In Part III, the paper discusses the two different “cost-sensitive” 
approaches adopted by the EPA under the Clean Air Act so far, and in 
Part IV, the paper discusses the basis for using the Clean Power Plan as a 
model and the advantages and disadvantages of “scaling up” the switching 
opportunities approach to the international arena. 
I.  PAST AND CURRENT ALLOCATION REGIMES 
A.  Kyoto Annex I 
In 1982, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCC) first established an international system for addressing climate 
change by nation-states and also established the principle that nations 
ought to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) “at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”2 
However, there were no binding emissions reductions commitments in the 
UNFCC itself.  It wasn’t until 1997 that the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCC 
sets binding emissions reductions commitments for developed countries (listed 
in Annex 1 to the UNFCC) to be met during the period of 2008 to 2012.3  
These reductions were spelled-out for each Annex 1 country in Annexes A 
and B of the Kyoto Protocol, and together were designed “to reduc[e] their 
overall emissions of [greenhouse] gases by at least 5 percent below 1990 
levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012.”4  For most developed 
countries, this required the same emissions reduction, namely to 92% of 
2. See U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 2, June 3, 1992, Treaty 
Doc. No. 102–38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, U.N. DOCS. (1992), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/ 
convkp/conveng.pdf. 
3. See KYOTO PROTOCOL TO THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, art. 3, Dec. 10 1997, U.N. Docs FCCC/CP1997/L.7/Add.1 (1998), 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
4. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, at art. 3.1.
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1990 levels by the end of the commitment period (or a roughly 8% reduction 
in GHG emissions), while some of the less developed or newly independent 
former Soviet states were given higher targets.5  Developing countries, most 
notably China, were not on the list of nations required to reduce emissions.6 
On its face, then, this first approach requires roughly equal emissions 
reductions by the most developed countries.  However, the Kyoto Protocol 
also provides for so-called flexibility mechanisms that might lead to 
fewer (or more) emissions reductions in each nation itself.  For example, 
Article 6 of the Protocol provides for “joint implementation,” which “allows 
a country with an emission reduction or limitation commitment under the 
Kyoto Protocol (Annex B Party) to earn emission reduction units (ERUs) 
from an emission-reduction or emission removal project in another Annex B 
Party, each equivalent to one tone of CO2, which can be counted towards 
meeting its Kyoto target.”7  Similarly, Article 17 of the Protocol allows for 
Emissions Trading, which “allows countries that have emission units to spare 
—emissions permitted them but not “used”—to sell this excess capacity 
to countries that are over their targets.”8  And Article 12 establishes the 
so-called Clean Development Mechanism, which “allows a country with 
an emission-reduction or emission-limitation commitment under the Kyoto 
Protocol (Annex B Party) to implement an emission-reduction project in 
developing countries. Such projects can earn saleable certified emission 
reduction (CER) credits, each equivalent to one tonne of CO2, which can 
be counted towards meeting Kyoto targets.”9 
Nonetheless, despite these flexibility mechanisms, the basic principle 
under the Kyoto Protocol remains the same.  The most developed countries 
must reduce emissions by roughly equal amounts.  The only flexibility is 
in whether those emissions reductions take place within the country or 
outside it. 
B.  The European Union’s ETS 
Following the Kyoto Protocol, the European Union (EU) instituted an 
emissions trading system (ETS) in order to fulfill its member states’ 
5. Id. at Annex B.
6. Id.
7. See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, KYOTO PROTOCOL:
MECHANISM: JOINT IMPLEMENTATION, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/joint 
_implementation/ items/1674.php; see also Kyoto Protocol, supra note at 3, art. 6. 
8. See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, KYOTO PROTOCOL:
MECHANISM: INTERNATIONAL EMISSION TRAINING, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mec 
hanisms/emissions_trading/items/2731.php. 
9. See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, KYOTO PROTOCOL:
MECHANISM: CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/ 
mechanisms/clean_development_mechanism/items/2718.php. 
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obligations under the treaty.  Under the ETS, the EU employed two different 
methods of allocating responsibility for controlling GHGs.  First, the EU 
adopted a system that allocated responsibility according to the individual 
country’s wealth.  Then, as the Kyoto commitment period ended, the EU 
adopted a system that allocated responsibility collectively.  Finally, the EU 
also adopted mandatory annual emissions targets for sectors not covered 
by ETS. 
1. ETS Phases I and II—Individual Wealth Allocation
As an Annex I party to the Kyoto Protocol, the European Community and 
its 15 Member States at the time of ratifying the Protocol agreed to reduce 
GHG emissions by at least 8% below 1990 levels during the “commitment 
period” of 2008 to 2012.10  By signing on as a collective entity, the EU 
took the first step in setting up a “cap and trade” system among its Member 
States.  The basic structure of such a system entails establishing an overall 
limit, or cap, on GHG emissions, granting facilities that emit GHGs allowances 
for each ton of carbon dioxide (or equivalent) that they emit, and giving 
the business that control these facilities one of three main options.  They 
can emit as much carbon dioxide as they have allowances, emit less and 
trade their excess allowances, or emit more and purchase excess allowances. 
By reducing the number of total allowances each year and penalizing 
businesses for non-compliance, total emissions decline, while businesses 
are incentivized to invest in emission-reducing capital projects.11 
The EU administered this program through its ETS.  In preparation for 
the Kyoto commitment period, the EU created a preliminary first phase 
which functioned as a pilot program for testing out this new cap and trade 
system, while the second phase coincided with the commitment period 
from 2008 to 2012.12  The EU further allocated responsibility for the 8% 
reduction among its Member States based on relative wealth.13  For example, 
10. UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, KYOTO
PROTOCOL REFERENCE MANUAL ON ACCOUNTING OF EMISSIONS AND ASSIGNED AMOUNT 13 
(2008), https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/08_unfccc_kp_ref_manual.pdf. 
11. Allowances and Caps, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/
ets/cap/index_en.htm (last updated Apr. 21, 2016). 
12. EU ETS 2005-2012, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/polici
es/ets/pre2013/index_en.htm (last updated Feb. 11, 2016). 
13. Kyoto emissions targets: Joint fulfillment, ‘burden sharing’ and base years,
EUROPEAN COMM’N, https://web.archive.org/web/20150703071343/http://ec.europa.eu/clima/ 
policies/g-gas/kyoto/index_en.htm (last updated May. 8, 2015). 
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the nation with the highest GDP per capita, Luxembourg, had to reduce its 
emissions by 28% vs. 1990 levels, whereas Portugal as the poorest of the 15 
was allowed to increase its emissions by 27%.14  With caps in place for each 
individual country, each Member State submitted National Allocation Plans 
(NAPs) that provided detailed emissions information for each GHG-emitting 
facility, or “installation” covered by the Kyoto Protocol—mainly power 
generators and energy-intensive industrial sectors—within its borders.15  
The EU subsequently reviewed the NAPs and granted the appropriate 
number of allowances to individual installations so that Member States met 
their individual reduction targets.16  Thus, by signing onto Kyoto as a collective 
entity, the EU created a system that redistributed individual nations’ 
responsibilities for climate change based on wealth relative to fellow 
Member States. 
2.  ETS Phase III—Collective Allocation 
As the Kyoto commitment period ended and follow-on international 
climate change negotiations stalled, the EU continued the ETS program, 
with some modifications to increase its effectiveness.17  Phase III, which 
started in 2013, maintained the basic structure of the system, but eliminated 
caps for individual countries.18  Instead, the EU established a single cap 
to cover the entire Union, which decreases over the course of Phase III, such 
that 2020 emissions will be 21% lower than 2005 levels.19  The responsibility 
to reduce emissions then falls directly upon individual GHG-emitting 
installations to reduce emissions each year, or purchase a sufficient number 
of allowances via the cap-and-trade system to cover actual emissions.20  
Thus, Member States are effectively bypassed in allocating responsibility, as 
an installation that emits 1,000 tons of carbon dioxide in Luxembourg will 
be treated exactly the same as an installation that emits 1,000 tons of 
 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  National allocation plans, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ 
ets/pre2013/nap/index_en.htm (last updated Feb. 11, 2016). 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  See generally United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Status 
of the Doha Amendment, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/doha_amendment/items/7362.php 
(last updated May 28, 2015). 
 18.  Allowances and Caps, EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 11. 
 19.  The cap set in 2013 was 2,084,301,856 allowances, decreasing by 1.74% linearly 
each year through 2020. Id. The EU changed the reference year for climate change 
objectives from 1990 to 2005 because the wealth of data collected in 2005 provides the 
most transparent method to measure progress.  Questions and Answers on the Effort 
Sharing Decision (October 2013), EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/effort/ 
faq_en.htm (last updated Apr. 15, 2016). 
 20.  Allowances and Caps, EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 11. 
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carbon dioxide in Portugal.  This system therefore treats Member States 
as equals, restricting emissions activity only to the extent that a Member 
State has GHG-emitting facilities within its borders. 
As an alternative view, this approach also allocates responsibility among 
Member States based on their relative income levels.  Assuming richer 
states to have more GHG-emitting facilities within its borders as a reflection 
of more extensive industrialization, while poorer, less industrialized nations 
will have fewer GHG-emitting facilities, Phase III effectively requires 
richer states to bear more of the burden of reducing emissions than poorer 
states.  While this approach is quite different from that of Phases I and 
II—namely because individual facilities are treated exactly the same in 
Phase III regardless of location within the EU—it still promulgates sharing 
responsibility based on some variation of relative income levels. 
3. Non-ETS/ Effort Sharing Decision
Since that ETS only covers approximately half of all GHG emissions, 
EU Member States adopted mandatory annual emissions targets for sectors 
not covered by ETS under the Effort Sharing Decision.21  Similar to the 
approach in ETS Phases I and II, the Effort Sharing Decision establishes 
caps for each Member State based on their relative GDP, with rich countries 
required to decrease emissions while granting poorer countries the flexibility 
to increase emissions.22  In particular, the Decision establishes limits for 
annual GHG emissions in 2020 compared to 2005 levels based on a Member 
State’s GDP per capita relative to the EU average.23  Countries with GDP 
per capita higher than the average must reduce their emissions by up to 
20%, while nations lower than the average may increase their emissions 
up to 20%.24  In the aggregate, these restrictions should reduce EU-wide 
21. ETS Phase III covered less than half of all emissions, including carbon dioxide
from power and heat generation, energy-intensive sectors, and commercial aviation; nitrous 
oxide from production of nitric, adipic, glyoxal and glyoxlic acids; and perfluorocarbons 
from aluminum production.  Sectors not covered by ETS include transport (excluding 
aviation), buildings, agriculture, and waste sectors, which collectively account for 55% to 
60% of all EU emissions.  Effort Sharing Decision, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/ 
policies/effort/index_en.htm (last updated Apr. 15, 2016). 
22. Id.
23. Decision No. 406/2009/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
23 April 2009 on the effort of Member States to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to 
meet the Community’s greenhouse gas emission reduction commitments up to 2020, 2009 
O.J. (L 140/136). 
24. Id.
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emissions in non-ETS sectors by 10% compared to 2005 levels.25  Combining 
that with the 21% reduction in ETS sectors is expected to accomplish the 
overall emissions reduction goal of 20% in 2020 vs. 1990 levels.26 
Therefore, as with ETS Phases I and II, emission reduction efforts for 
non-ETS sectors allocate responsibility based on each Member States’ 
relative income.  Wealthy countries must cut emissions, while poorer countries 
may increase emissions.  However, this approach is built upon the assumption 
that less wealthy countries will experience a higher rate of economic growth, 
leading to higher emissions, so such countries will still effectively need to 
reduce their emissions over the period.27  Nevertheless, in striking the Effort 
Sharing Decision, Member States divided up emission reductions based 
on relative wealth. 
C.  Current Schemes Unsuccessful 
While the current allocation schemes described supra have certainly 
done something to reduce GHG emissions, they have been demonstrably 
inadequate.  By almost every account, the Kyoto Protocol has not resulted 
in substantial emissions reductions.  It has not obtained the formal 
agreement of the United States, and formal signatories appear to be largely 
unmoved by it with respect to actual energy policy decisions.  Emissions 
continue to rise, and when and where they stall, economic slowdowns 
appear to account for that phenomenon as much or more than Kyoto-inspired 
policy.  By all accounts, the first phase of the EU ETS did not produce 
emissions reductions that otherwise would not have occurred.  It is possible 
that the current phase will fare much better. But the current phase requires 
centralized planning and regulation in the form of per-facility targets that 
is hard to imagine outside of federal or quasi-federal union, and thus is 
hard to imagine working as part of an international agreement on the scale 
of Kyoto or even a multilateral agreement among non-common-union nation 
states. 
The Kyoto and to a large Extent EU approach to allocation is cost-
insensitive. Emission reductions targets are allocated without regard to the 
question of how much it would cost to have each target achieved.  Thus, 
on its face, putting aside the possibility that trading or other mechanisms 
will help equalize costs to a degree, this approach calls on some actors to 
take on targets that entail very high compliance costs relative top others. 
25. Questions and Answers on the Effort Sharing Decision (October 2013), supra
note 19. 
26. Effort Sharing Decision, EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 21.
27. Id.
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From both an efficiency and equity perspective, this is problematic, as 
commentators have explained.28 
The post-Kyoto round of talks have focused on inclusion of a larger 
number of nations, including poorer or less industrialized nations, and have 
involved extensive discussions of differentiated responsibilities based on 
a range of factors—wealth or GDP of the nation, economic dependence on 
fossil fuel production, threat from climate change and need to adapt, as, 
for example, in the case of low-lying countries.  But the compliance costs 
for each nation of emission reductions—and in particular costs of switching 
from coal to oil to natural gas and from fossil fuels to renewables—has not 
been an explicit focus of the largely unfocused discussions of differentiated 
responsibilities. 
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Given the failure of the current regime, it is natural to ask whether a 
different emissions reduction scheme would do better.  There has been no 
shortage of other schemes proposed.  For example, some developing 
nations such as China have proposed allocating emissions reductions per 
capita.29  The aim of such a scheme would be to allow roughly equal 
emissions for each person in the world, regardless of where they lived.  
“The intuition here is that every person on the planet should begin with 
the same emissions right; it should not matter whether people find 
themselves in a nation whose existing emissions rates are low or high.”30  
While such a scheme certainly has intuitive appeal, there are several reasons 
why it will likely never become the basis for a new agreement.  First, for 
 
 28.  Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful Cap-and-Trade System to Address Climate Change, 
32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293, 294 (2008) (“Many analysts—particularly economists—have 
been highly critical of the Kyoto Protocol, noting that, because of specific deficiencies, it 
will be ineffective and relatively costly for the little it accomplishes.”) (citing Joseph E. 
Aldy, Scott Barrett & Robert N. Stavins, Thirteen Plus One: A Comparison of Global 
Climate Policy Architectures, 3 CLIMATE POL’Y 373 (2003)). 
 29.  See, e.g., China’s National Climate Change Programme (promulgated by the 
Nat’l Development and Reform Commission, June 2007), at 58 (China), www.ccchina.gov.cn/ 
website/ccchina/upfile/file188.pdf. 
 30.  Eric Posner & Cass Sunstein, Should Greenhouse Gas Permits Be Allocated on 
a Per Capita Basis?, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 51, 53 (2009). 
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pragmatic reasons, developed countries like the United States will likely 
never agree to it.  “Nations are unlikely to sign an international agreement 
if they will be significant net losers, and wealthy nations might lose a great 
deal from any approach that does not use existing emissions as the baseline 
for reductions.”31  Second, it is not even clear that the per capita approach 
would benefit most developing nations.  As Posner and Sunstein demonstrate, 
“there are rich small states [], and poor big states [], and everything in between.  
[T]here is no statistically significant correlation between population and per 
capita GDP.”32  While China and India would certainly benefit from such 
a scheme, many other developing nations would not. 
In sum, it is highly unlikely that a per capita emissions scheme will form 
the basis of a new agreement going forward, and it is equally unlikely that 
such a scheme would fulfill the distributive justice rationales that underpin 
it in any event. 
Similar objections surround proposals to gear emissions reductions to 
nation’s historical contributions to net carbon emissions. In this polluter-
pay approach, nations that have long been industrialized would pay much 
more than newly or non-industrialized nations.  But, normatively, holding 
current populations of industrialized countries responsible for past emissions 
by past generations is problematic, at least from some philosophical 
perspectives as Posner and Sunstein also argue.  Moreover, politically, the 
idea that past polluting nations owe much more in terms of emissions 
reduction efforts because of their past “wrongs” would seem to be a political 
non-starter that would run counter to the “we are all in this together” spirit of 
collective action against climate change, which may be necessary to achieve 
success. 
Allocations tied to a nation’s GDP are also normatively problematic, 
because there is no widespread acceptance by as to what constitutes a 
“rich” country as opposed to a “middle class” or poor one and, even more 
so, there is no widespread agreement as to how much of a social obligation 
or an obligation of helping rich nations owe or should be deemed to owe 
poor ones.  Indeed, it is not obvious that there is a general buy-in to the 
idea that rich countries should substantially aid poor ones: much foreign 
aid by wealthy countries, and by the U.S. in particular, appears driven by 
military and geopolitical considerations more than a normative commitment 
to help nations in need. 
31. Id. at 55.
32. Id. at 74.  They also note that because permits are allocated to governments, not 
citizens, wealthy elites in developing nations would likely still hold the dominant number 
of permits.  Id. at 75. 
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As economists have pointed out, the equal-percentage-reduction approach 
of Kyoto and (to a lesser degree) the EU has no rationale in welfare 
economics, which would endeavor to factor in costs and benefits to each 
nation of reducing emissions.  But an allocation regime based on equal-
welfare-effects would be far too complex and contestable to be workable. 
How much each nation benefits from reducing carbon in the atmosphere 
is not an easy question: some nations are more vulnerable to climate 
change but there is a great deal of uncertainty regarding vulnerabilities in 
the event of different climate change scenarios, as well as the basic 
uncertainty as to what effect any climate change mitigation effort will have 
on climate change.  Reducing emissions may have substantial non-climate 
health benefits, such as less asthma or other lung diseases, but these too 
may be contestable and it is not obvious that a nation that has not been 
motivated to achieve these health benefits for their own sake would accept 
their being used as a rationale for being subject to a higher emissions 
reductions target than they would have received without consideration of 
those benefits. 
In welfare economics, benefits are only half the picture; costs are the other 
half.  To assess the full economic costs to each nation of emissions reductions, 
an assessment, not just of the direct cost of compliance with possible 
emissions reduction targets, but also with the overall economic effects of 
the compliance efforts, including downstream effects on investment, savings, 
and employment would be required.  As suggested by the debates in the 
United States over whether any given environmental regulation will ruin an 
industry or actually help it long-term, or whether an environmental regulation 
is an economic drag or a long-term win-win, it is highly contestable what the 
overall economic costs of a nation shifting to a low-carbon or no-carbon 
future will be.  For that reason presumably, and defensibly, the EPA in the 
Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Clean Air Act refuses to attempt to quantify 
social costs of its rule and uses compliance costs as the sole costs to be 
considered as part of a cost benefit analysis.  As discussed below, however, 
the direct, upfront, compliance costs—the costs of switching from coal to 
natural gas and/or coal and gas and oil to renewables—may be more subject 
to reliable, commonly-accepted estimates. 
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C.  Other Possible Schemes 
There are many other possible bases for allocating emissions.33  Yet so 
far, none of them has gained any traction in the international talks designed 
to lead to a new agreement.  Instead, the latest U.N. Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties (COP21) has 
relied on Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), a process 
whereby nations determine their own contributions to GHG emissions 
reductions.  The hope is that such an approach “can create a constructive 
feedback loop between national and international decision-making on 
climate change.”34  However, such INDCs have also been criticized as 
lacking transparency.35  In addition, while almost 87% of global emissions 
are covered by countries that have submitted INDCs,36 there are serious 
concerns that these pledges, even if adhered to, will not meet the goal of 
keeping average global temperatures below 2 degrees Celsius.37 
Thus, a reasonable question is: are there better ways to allocate responsibility 
for carbon emissions (and net reduction thereof) among nations? Is there 
an allocative approach that has not yet been tried, but that may work better 
in terms of getting nations to agree and keeping average global temperatures 
below 2 degrees Celsius? 
III.  A COST-SENSITIVE APPROACH 
Nearly every criticism of emissions reduction measures includes a 
concern over costs.  Nations are concerned that the overall costs of GHG 
reductions will be too high, and/or that such costs will not be shared equitably 
among nations.  One response to such criticism, then, would be to make 
costs an explicit part of any emissions reduction scheme. 
 
 33.  See DANIEL BODANSKI ET AL., PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, 
INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE EFFORTS BEYOND 2012: A SURVEY OF APPROACHES 1 (2004). 
 34.  See What is an INDC?, WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE (2015), http://www.wri.org/ 
indc-definition. 
 35.  See Thomas Damassa et al., Interpreting INDCs: Assessing Transparency of 
Pos-2020 Greenhouse Gas Emissions Targets For 8 Top-Emitting Economies, WORLD 
RESOURCES INSTITUTE, at 7 (Dec. 2015), http://www.wri.org/sites/default/files/wri_wp_ 
interpretingINDCs.pdf. 
 36.  See U.N. Secretariat, Synthesis Report on the Aggregate Effect of the Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions, at 4, U.N. DOC. FCCC/CP/2015/7 (Oct. 30 2015), 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/07.pdf. 
 37.  See Int’l Energy Agency, Energy and Climate Change, at 12 (2015), http:// 
www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/WEO2015SpecialReportonEnergy 
andClimateChange.pdf; but see David Victor & Charles Kennel, Climate Policy: Ditch the 
2 Degree C Warming Goal, NATURE PUBLISHING GROUP (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www. 
nature.com/news/climate-policy-ditch-the-2-c-warming-goal-1.16018, for a criticism of 
the 2 degree target. 
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In this section, we examine two different models for a cost-sensitive 
emissions reduction approach.  Both models derive from prior EPA 
rulemakings under the Clean Air Act.  The first and more traditional model 
seeks to equalize costs among states with respect to each ton of emissions 
reduction.  In other words, under this model, states subject to the rule must 
each reduce emissions in the amount that can be achieved at a certain 
price-per-ton of abatement.  This was the EPA’s approach under its various 
ozone abatement rules, most recently the Cross State Air Pollution Rule, or 
CSAPR, as discussed more fully below. 
The second cost-sensitive approach is the one the EPA employed in its 
Clean Power Plan.  Under this approach, the EPA did not explicitly seek 
to equalize the cost-per-ton of emissions abatement.  Instead, the EPA 
seems to have made certain assumptions about how much it would cost 
states to switch to clean power sources, based on factors such as the state’s 
natural endowments (sunshine, wind, etc.), the amount of clean power capacity 
already built or planned, a state’s political capacity to make further emissions 
reductions, and grid accessibility for that state. These various “cost” measures 
then became factors in the amount of GHG reductions each state would 
be required to bear.  The costs were not equalized on a “per ton” measure, 
but rather in a more amorphous, overall way. 
A.  The Traditional Cost-Conscious Model 
The EPA initially designed an emissions reduction system that tries to 
roughly equalize costs among polluters when it promulgated rules regarding 
ozone precursors.  In the EPA’s 1998 nitrogen oxide (NOx) SIP call, the 
EPA decided that the 23 “significant contributor” upwind states “need only 
reduce their ozone by the amount achievable with ‘highly cost-effective 
controls,’” which the EPA defined to be “ones that could be achieved (in the 
EPA’s estimate) for less than $2000 a ton.”38  The result of this cost-
based cutback meant, of course, that emissions reductions “would vary 
from state to state depending on variations in cutback costs.”39  However, 
the costs per ton of abatement would remain roughly the same.  In other 
words, each state would be required to reduce NOx emissions by the 
amount that could be achieved at a uniform cost, but because the costs-
per-ton of reduction for some states would be higher (generally those were 
 
 38.  See Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 6675 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 39.  Id. 
BARSA-DANA (DO NOT DELETE) 8/8/2016  3:09 PM 
 
16 
the states that had already taken the easy measures to reduce emissions) 
and costs-per-ton of reduction for some states would be lower (generally 
those were the states that hadn’t done much yet, and thus had several easy 
measures still available to them), the end result was that states faced 
different percentages of required reduction depending on where they were 
along the marginal abatement cost curve.  
A similar design was carried forward into EPA’s Cross State Air 
Pollution Rule, or CSAPR.  Here, EPA designed a system with respect to 
the ozone precursors nitrogen oxide (NOx) and sulfur dioxide (SO2).  If 
an “upwind” state emits these chemicals in threshold amounts detected at 
“downwind” states, then the CSAPR mandates that the upwind states reduce 
emissions by reference to certain cost thresholds, which would be uniformly 
applied within groups of upwind states.  These uniform or equal cost thresholds 
are then applied to create different emissions “budgets” in each upwind 
state.  As the Supreme Court described it:  “EPA translated the cost thresholds 
it had selected into amounts of emissions upwind States would be required 
to eliminate.  For each regulated upwind State, EPA created an annual 
emissions ‘budget.’  These budgets represented the quantity of pollution 
an upwind State would produce in a given year if its in-state sources 
implemented all pollution controls available at the chosen cost thresholds.”40 
As with the NOx SIP call, each upwind state under the CSAPR is 
subject to a uniform cost threshold,41 but these uniform costs translate into 
different emissions “budgets” for each upwind state.42  EPA calculated how 
much pollution each upwind State could eliminate “if all of its sources 
applied pollution control technologies available at particular cost thresholds,”43 
and then required the states to reduce pollution by that amount.  Again, 
this approach attempts to roughly equalize the costs per ton of reduction 
that the upwind states will face.  Indeed, EPA explicitly rejected a uniform 
percentage-of-emissions reduction rule (akin to the Kyoto rule discussed 
 
 40.  EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1621–22 (2014). 
 41.  Technically, the cost thresholds were uniform within different groups of upwind 
states. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., v. EPA, 795 F.3d 118, 126 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 
(“In the end, EPA adopted four cost thresholds for the 27 upwind States subject to the 
Transport Rule.  For all States subject to the Rule for annual NOx, EPA set a $500/ton cost 
threshold.  See Transport Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 48,250.  For States subject to the Rule for 
ozone-season NOx, EPA also set a $500/ton cost threshold.  See id.  For States subject to 
the Rule for SO2, EPA divided the States into two groups.  For Group 1 States, EPA set a 
$2,300/ton cost threshold.  See id. at 48,259.  For Group 2 States, EPA set a $500/ton cost 
threshold.  See id.”). 
 42.  See, e.g., Final June Revisions Rule State Budgets and New Unit Set-Asides 
TSD, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY OFF. OF AIR & RADIATION (JUNE 2012), http://www3.epa. 
gov/crossstaterule/pdfs/FinalJuneRevisionsRuleStateBudgetsandNewUnitSetAsidesTSD.
pdf (widely varying state budgets). 
 43.  EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 795 F.3d 118 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
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supra) because such a rule would have had perverse effects.  As the EPA 
noted in one of its Technical Support Documents for the Transport Rule:  
“since all contributing states would be required to do the same percent 
reduction of existing emissions, states that had previously implemented 
stringent control programs might not be able to achieve the required 
reductions using existing control technologies, while others that had 
previously done little (and presumably have larger absolute contributions) 
would achieve their required reductions using significantly less than optimal 
control technologies.”44 
Of course, some of EPA’s hesitation to use equal percentage reduction 
of emission measures in the CSAPR (and in its NOx SIP call) was driven 
by the complexity of NOX and SO2 interactions, and the impossibility of 
tying individual upwind states’ contributions to particular downwind states’ 
receptors.45  Nonetheless, the equal costs idea played a prominent role in 
the design of the CSAPR. 
This roughly equal costs measure then resulted in varying emissions 
budgets for each state.  EPA assumed a traditional increasing marginal cost 
curve.  As it stated in one of its technical documents to the Transport Rule 
(the precursor to the CSAPR), “EPA designed a series of IPM [Integrated 
Planning Model] runs that imposed increasing marginal costs for reduction 
of SO2, annual NOx, or ozone season NOx emissions and tabulated those 
projected emissions at each cost level.”46  In other words, EPA assumed 
the marginal cost of emissions abatement would increase as that abatement 
increased.  With that assumption in mind, EPA then selected various points 
along this increasing marginal abatement cost curve and projected emissions 
at those levels.  It used air quality measures to determine where the marginal 
benefits of increased abatement would decrease.  Based on these data, EPA 
decided what each upwind state’s emissions budget would be. 
 
 44.  Alternative Significant Contribution Approaches Evaluated, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY OFF. OF AIR & RADIATION (JULY 2000), http://perma.cc/4LJC-SY9N. 
 45.  See EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1604–05 (2014).  
Note that these concerns should not play as large a role with respect to GHG emissions, 
because those emissions do not depend on interactions with other GHG emissions for their 
potency, nor do they cause local effects that depend on exactly where the wind blows them. 
 46.  See Analysis to Quantify Significant Contribution, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY 
OFF. OF AIR & RADIATION (JULY 2000), at 6, http://www3.epa.gov/crossstaterule/pdfs/TSD_ 
analysis_to_quantify_significant_contribution_7-8-10.pdf. 
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B.  EPA’s Clean Power Plan Considers Costs Differently 
The EPA’s Clean Power Plan, on the other hand, is sensitive to costs in 
a much different way, perhaps because it addresses power plants’ carbon 
dioxide emissions,47 and is aimed, in addition to enhancing efficiency, at 
switching power generation away from carbon emitting sources altogether.48 
Under the Clean Power Plan, the EPA assigned emission reduction targets 
to each state.49  These targets vary in terms of the requisite emission 
reductions, and are not equal in terms of either a required percentage reduction 
in net emissions or emissions per capita, or emissions per household.50 
More precisely, under the EPA’s plan, each state must meet a target of 
emission reduction, called the Best System of Emission Reduction, or BSER. 
This derives from Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act’s requirement that 
EPA prescribe regulations that require each state to submit a plan that 
“establishes standards of performance” for existing sources of air pollution. 
A “standard of performance” is in turn a term of art, defined under Clean 
Air Act Section 111(a)(1) to mean “a standard for emissions of air pollutants 
which reflects the degree of emission limitation achievable through the 
application of the best system of emission reduction which (taking into 
account the cost of achieving such reduction and any non-air quality health 
and environmental impact and energy requirements) the Administrator 
determines has been adequately demonstrated.” 
Based on its evaluation of various GHG abatement measures, “EPA 
identified four categories of demonstrated measures, or ‘building blocks,’ 
that are technically viable and broadly applicable, and can provide cost-
effective reductions in CO2 emissions from individual existing EGUs.”51  
These building blocks include the three that were reflected in the final 
rule:  (1) Increasing the operational efficiency of existing coal-fired power 
plants; (2) Shifting electricity generation from higher emitting fossil fuel-
fired steam power plants (generally coal-fired) to lower emitting natural 
47. See FACT SHEET: Clean Power Plan Overview, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, at
http://www2.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet-clean-power-plan-overview (last updated 
Apr. 11, 2016). 
48. See FACT SHEET: Clean Power Plan Benefits of a Cleaner, More Efficient
Power Sector, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/fact-
sheet-clean-power-plan-benefits-cleaner-more-efficient-power-sector (last updated Aug. 13, 
2015). 
49. See FACT SHEET: Clean Power Plan Framework, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www2.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet-clean-power-plan-framework (last updated 
May 11, 2013). 
50. See id.
51. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY OFF. OF AIR & RADIATION, GHG ABATEMENT
MEASURES 1-1 (2014), http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201406/documents/2014 
0602tsd-ghg-abatement-measures.pdf. 
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gas-fired power plants; and (3) Increasing electricity generation from 
renewable sources of energy like wind and solar.52 
The EPA applies these “building blocks” in order to calculate the BSER 
for each state.53  EPA’s exact formula is complex, and involves a consideration 
of a number of judgment calls.  In its Goal Computation Technical Support 
Document, EPA used historical 2012 emissions data for each state as the 
basis for each state’s emission rate goal under the Proposed Rule.54  EPA 
then applied the BSER “building blocks” to compute interim and final 
goals in various ways.  In doing so, certain cost-based factors became clear. 
For Building Block 1, for example—the operational efficiency of coal 
plants—EPA assumed that, to a certain extent, heat rate improvements at 
coal plants (i.e., improvements in the amount of energy required to produce 
each kWh of energy) would be highly economically beneficial, perhaps 
even paying for themselves.55  EPA looked at factors such as the best historical 
heat rate performance for each EGU and calculated the overall potential 
for heat rate improvements within each of 3 regional grid interconnections.56 
These factors are consistent with a traditional model where we assume 
steadily rising marginal costs of abatement.  Indeed, EPA studied various 
low-cost measures such as equipment upgrades and contrasted them with 
higher-cost “best practices” and noted that some EGUs could achieve almost 
all of their emission reductions using equipment upgrades alone.57 
When it comes to energy efficiency in consumption or demand-side 
efficiency, which EPA left out of the final “building blocks” (though it 
still gives states the opportunity to get credits toward its emission targets 
for certain types of energy efficiency projects), EPA also assumed a 
52. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CLEAN POWER PLAN-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
FOR STATES 1, http://www3.epa.gov/airquality/cpptoolbox/technical-summary-for-states.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2016). 
53. Id. at 1–2.
54. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY OFF. OF AIR & RADIATION, GOAL COMPUTATION
TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT 4, 8 (2014), http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014- 
06/documents/20140602t sd-goal-computation.pdf. 
55. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY OFF. OF AIR & RADIATION, GREENHOUSE GAS 
MITIGATION MEASURES 2–65 (2015), http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-
11/ documents/tsd-cpp-ghg-mitigation-measures.pdf. 
56. Id. at 2–22. See also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY OFF. OF AIR & RADIATION,
CO2 EMISSION PERFORMANCE RATE AND GOAL COMPUTATION TECHNICAL SUPPORT 
DOCUMENT FOR CPP FINAL RULE 3 (2015), http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/ 
2015-11/documents/tsd-cpp-emission-performance-rate-goal-computation.pdf. 
57. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY OFF. OF AIR & RADIATION, supra note 55, at
2–63. 
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traditional rising marginal cost of emissions abatement curve.  EPA expressly 
noted that:  “It is generally assumed in most energy efficiency projections 
that the cost of installing energy efficiency measures will become more 
expensive into the future as state programs move beyond ‘low-hanging 
fruit’ and increasingly focus on achieving deeper and broader energy savings 
through whole-building, multi-fuel programs addressing new buildings 
and building retrofits.”58 
On the other hand, when applying the renewable energy building block, 
EPA appears to have assumed a very different cost curve.  In the proposed 
rule, EPA looked at the “current goals of leading states in the same region,” 
which reflected “renewable potential in particular regions of the country.”59 
EPA used “the state-level effective RE levels derived from RPS requirements 
to quantify regional RE targets consistent with states’ reasonable level of 
increased RE development.”60  EPA derived regional RE generation targets 
and growth rates and imposed “the same regional RE target in percentage 
(share of total generation) terms to all states in a given region.”61  The regional 
targets would be set for the year 2029.  “The EPA then determined the 
constant rate at which each region would need to increase its generation 
each year to reach the regional RPS target, if these rates are applied in the 
period 2017-2029.  The constant rate of annual RE generation increase 
calculated from this approach is called the growth factor.”62  Regional growth 
factors varied from a low of 6% in the West region to a high of 17% in the 
East Central region.63 
Implicit in the constant growth factor is that EPA either assumed a flat 
marginal cost curve, or was simply indifferent to costs.  What EPA did not 
do was assume a rising marginal cost curve and assume that early growth 
would be more rapid or that states that hadn’t done much already could 
do more at lower cost.  Indeed, EPA seemed to make the opposite assumption 
in some cases, due to the design of the regional targets, as discussed infra. 
Importantly, “the regional RE target is not applied directly as an 
immediate requirement of each state, but is instead used to calculate a 
regional growth factor that is then applied to each state’s pre-existing RE 
58. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY OFF. O F AIR & RADIATION, PROJECTING EGU 
CO2 EMISSION PERFORMANCE IN STATE PLANS 27 (2014), http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/ 
files/2014-06/documents/20140602tsd-projecting-egu-co2emission-performance.pdf. 
59. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY OFF. OF AIR & RADIATION, supra note 51.
60. Id. at 4–12.
61. Id. at 4–19.
62. Id. at 4–19.
63. Id. at 4–18.  The West region is comprised of Colorado, New Mexico, Wyoming,
Montana, and all states to the west (except Alaska and Hawaii).  The East Central region 
is comprised of Ohio, West Virginia, Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and New 
Jersey.  See id. at 4–14. 
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generation, such that historic RE performance acts as a limiting factor on 
the extent to which a state is assumed to reach the regional target.”64  What 
this meant was that “the absolute megawatt-hour target will be smaller for 
states starting with a lower absolute amount of RE generation and larger 
for a state starting with a higher absolute amount of RE generation.”65  
Moreover, “several states do not reach the RE percentage target in the proposed 
approach, such as Kentucky in the Southeast and Nevada in the West.”66  
Kentucky, which got 0% of its energy from renewables in 2012, would 
only get to 1.9% by 2029, whereas Nevada, which was at 8% in 2012, would 
get up to 19%.67  By contrast, Ohio, which got only 1% of its energy from 
renewables in 2012, would get to 10.6% by 2029, and Oregon, which got 
12% of its energy from renewables in 2012, would get all the way up to 
20.6% by 2029.68 
These vast discrepancies are due to several regional and state-specific 
factors, but EPA was clear that its overall approach was “designed to 
respect each state’s ability to improve toward the RE targets.”69  Again, 
EPA did not simply assume that all states faced a roughly similar (and rising) 
marginal cost curve.  Instead, EPA was sensitive to the various factors—such 
as regional differences and natural endowments—that might limit states’ 
ability to “switch” power generation to renewables.  While the CPP’s final 
rule is still more complex—it both changes the final state targets and the 
methods by which states can meet those targets70—there is still no 
assumption that states that have not deployed much RE can rely on “low-
hanging fruit” to do more than states that have.71 
Indeed, the CPP has come under criticism from some states and 
commentators for precisely this reason.  States have complained that the 
64. Id. at 4–19 (emphases added).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 4–24.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 4–20 (emphasis added).
70. See Are you better off under the Clean Power Plan than you were 14 months
ago?, INT’L DIST. ENERGY ASS’N (Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.districtenergy.org/blog/ 
2015/08/12/are-you-better-off-under-the-clean-power-plan-than-you-were-14-months-ago/. 
71. On the other hand, some states with already robust RE are given relaxed targets
because each state is subject to the same RE growth assumption until it reaches the RE 
generation target, whereupon it is kept at that target level for the remainder of the relevant 
time period. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY OFF. OF AIR & RADIATION, GHG ABATEMENT 
MEASURES 4–19 (2014), http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-06/documents/ 
20140602tsd-ghg-abatement-measures.pdf. 
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CPP demands something of all states, and does not systematically “reward” 
states that have already done more to switch to renewables, nor “punish” 
states that have not.72  Rather than being a flaw, this appears to be part of 
the overall design. 
C.  A “Switching Costs” Approach 
The above analysis of the Clean Power Plan and the CSAPR is 
consistent with the notion that where a regulatory regime is focused not 
simply on increasing efficiency, but on “switching” generation from one 
form to another, we should assume a very different marginal cost of 
abatement function and not simply demand more from states that have not 
yet done much “switching.”  In other words, the goal of the Clean Power 
Plan was not simply to make current coal plants more efficient (i.e., building 
block #1), but rather to replace some of those plants with low or no-GHG-
emitting renewables.  In setting the regional targets to support its RE 
building block, EPA was sensitive to natural endowments, such as sunshine 
or wind, in order to set the assumed renewables growth rates for states within 
that region.  These natural endowments certainly affect the switching costs 
for Building Block 3 faced by the states.  There are also, of course, significant 
capital costs involved in building out renewable capacity, whether it be 
for wind or solar or other forms of renewable energy.  Such capital costs 
are particularly high for utility-scale thermal solar projects and offshore 
wind projects.73  Indeed, capital costs may be a reason to assume, in a 
“switching” scenario, a marginal cost of abatement function that is not the 
traditional steadily rising one, but rather one that has a significant “hump” 
72. See Press Release, Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Christie Admin. Seeks Admin. Stay
and Reconsideration of EPA’s Clean Power Plan (Sept. 2, 2015),  http://www.nj.gov/ 
dep/newsrel/2015/150073.htm (quoting DEP Commissioner Bob Martin, “One of the 
greatest ironies of the so-called Clean Power Plan is that while New Jersey has made 
great strides in reducing carbon emissions and other pollutants as well that cause smog 
and other air quality problems, states that are upwind of New Jersey actually are assigned 
emission reduction goals that fall far short of what New Jersey has already achieved.”); 
see also WILLIAM W. BUZBEE ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, THE CLEAN
POWER PLAN: ISSUES TO WATCH 62–63 (1506 ed. 2015), http://progressivereform.org/ 
articles/CPP_1506.pdf (“This ‘every state must do its part’ approach arguably results in failing 
to reward states that made significant investments in de-carbonizing measures in the past 
while rewarding those states that put off such investments,” while warning that generalizations 
are “tricky” and that compliance cost estimates across states vary widely”). 
73. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., UPDATED CAPITAL COST ESTIMATES FOR UTILITY 
SCALE ELECTRICITY GENERATING PLANTS 6 (2013), available at http://www.eia.gov/fore 
casts/capitalcost/pdf/updated_capcost.pdf. 
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around the time when new facilities must be constructed.74  This is especially 





























L TO THE 
The state-specific targets in EPA’s proposed Clean Power Plan received 
much criticism from individual states on technical grounds, and the final 
rule no doubt will be subject to technical criticisms.  But for our purposes, 
the key question is not whether EPA got its formula right or applied it 
correctly in each instance.  The question is whether the idea implicit in 
EPA’s approach—that the different costs each state faces in terms of 
switching to lower-carbon or no-carbon generation—should factor into an 
allocation of emissions reductions.  EPA’s plan raises the question of whether 
compliance costs—as opposed to the more amorphous and difficult-to-assess 
economic costs—should count in a substantial way when responsibilities 
for a common pollution problem (here, climate change) are allocated among 
states. 
The first thing to note is that we assume the cost function for GHG 
reductions in the international context will follow the more complex 
“switching costs” function described supra instead of the traditional steadily 
increasing function of the CSAPR.  By “costs” we focus, as EPA does under 
the Clean Power Plan, largely on switching costs—i.e., the costs of 
switching from coal to gas, and gas to solar and/or wind.  No doubt there 
will be some high-emitting nations for which relatively low-cost efficiency 
measures can do a great deal to reduce GHG emissions.  But ultimately 
we assume that such measures will be of limited value and that, ultimately, 
74. There is also some reason to believe that the marginal cost of emissions abatement
would decrease after the capital expenditure “hump” as states (and nations) gain experience in 
the new technologies.  For example, Germany has lower installed costs of solar than the 
United States, in part because its solar sector is more robust.  See FRED HEUTTE, NW. ENERGY
COAL., EXPERIENCE CURVES AND SOLAR PV (2015), available at http://www.nwcouncil.org/ 
media/6867808/2012-09-03-nwec-experience-curves-and-solar-pv.pdf. 
75. EPA separately analyzed the costs of switching from coal to natural gas
(Building Block 2).  There it found that the cost of fuel, and not capital costs, were the 
major cost drivers.  See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY OFF. OF AIR & RADIATION, supra note 
71, at 6–5. 
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those nations will face a “hump” in their cost curves as they are forced to 
switch their forms of power generation.76 
Therefore, using the Clean Power Plan’s cost assumptions as a starting 
point, we ask the question:  could a “switching costs” approach form a plausible 
basis for an international agreement?  In other words, could an approach 
that is sensitive to different nations’ costs (whether capital costs or natural 
endowments) and different regional factors, resulting in potentially quite 
varied emissions reduction goals, succeed where other approaches have 
failed? 
A.  The Advantages of a Cost-Sensitive Approach 
1. Facilitating Agreement
An approach of imposing relatively lower percentage reductions on states 
or nations with relatively high switching costs could be helpful in obtaining 
agreement among states or nations even if some sort of trading regime is 
also part of the proposed regime.  For a nation or state facing high switching 
costs, the availability and costs of any emissions credits that could be bought 
under a trading regime will, ex ante, be quite unpredictable.  Thus, in deciding 
whether to agree or how strongly to oppose a proposed emission reductions 
target, the powers-that-be in the nation or state with high switching costs 
will have to assume that they may be called upon to make all the emissions 
reductions through actual reduction within their own borders as opposed 
to relying on the possibility that lower cost emissions credits will be 
available to be purchased from states or nations that face relatively lower 
switching costs. 
To make this point more concrete, imagine a regime with just two states 
or nations—A and B.  A has relatively high switching costs, because it 
has four large coal-powered plants, no natural gas infrastructure yet, and 
only modest but expandable wind power infrastructure that provides a 
small fraction of its power.  B has one old coal-powered plant, two natural 
gas plants with expansion capacity and substantial wind, solar and hydropower 
76. For simplicity’s sake, we focus here on power generation, because it is the single 
largest sector responsible for GHG emissions globally.  See THOMAS BRUCKNER ET AL.,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, WORKING GROUP III FIFTH ASSESSMENT 
REP. 516 (2014), available at file:///Users/erinmuniga/Downloads/ipcc_wg3_ar5_ 
chapter7%20(1).pdf. (noting that “[t]he energy supply sector is the largest contributor to global 
greenhouse gas emissions” and that “[i]n 2010, the energy supply sector was responsible for 
approximately 35% of total anthropogenic GHG emissions”).  Nonetheless, we recognize that 
GHG emission sources come from many different sectors, and power generation is only 
one piece of the puzzle.  We also recognize that a “switching costs” approach may be of limited 
value for countries that currently have very little in the way of GHG emissions, but might 
have such emissions in the future. 
BARSA-DANA (DO NOT DELETE) 8/8/2016  3:09 PM 
[VOL. 7:  1, 2015–16]  A Switching Costs Approach 
 SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW 
 25 
infrastructure, with possibilities for expanded use.  In a Kyoto-like regime, 
both A and B might be told that they must reduce emissions by 50%.  To 
do so, A could close two of its four coal-powered plants, while developing 
natural gas generation capacity and ramping up renewable capacity. The 
costs of doing so would be high.  State B would have to do quite a bit less 
to meet its target, as it already has natural gas power generation and 
renewable generation that could be ramped up to substitute for the power 
currently generated by its single coal power plant (which, let us assume, 
now accounts for a large share of its emissions).  State B could exceed its 
50% target by relying more on renewable expansion than natural gas 
expansion, and it could then sell excess emissions credits to State A. But 
State B might decide not to over-comply, that is, exceed the 50% target, 
because of questions about the reliability of renewables.  Moreover, if 
State B did over-comply and exceed the 50% target, it might not want to 
sell credits corresponding to any extra emissions reductions to State A at 
all.  Rather, State A might prefer to bank those credits as protection in case it 
needs to emit more from its natural gas plants because of unanticipated 
surges in power demands or because of problems of reliability in the power 
produced by its renewables infrastructure.  Indeed, under the S02 trading 
regime established by the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments, utilities engaged 
in such banking, with the result that there was less selling by “over-
complying” utilities than might have otherwise been the case.  Finally, ex 
ante, State A would have no way of knowing the price of any credits that 
would be sold by State B.  The overall point is simply this:  even where a 
trading regime might help defray cost faced by states or nations that must 
transition to cleaner energy ex post (after the targets are accepted by the 
states or nations), ex ante, making targets sensitive to switching costs might 
facilitate the agreement to targets by states or nations that face relatively 
high switching costs. 
2.  Resonating with a Message of Unity 
Second, being sensitive to switching costs treats climate change as a 
wholly collective problem created by all, and for which all must make roughly 
“equal” contributions in terms of increased electricity rates, at least.  By 
contrast, in approaches where allocation are based on percentage reductions 
in a state’s emissions or emissions per capita, the costs any person incurs 
may depend largely on his or her State of current residence.  To make current 
residency a key factor in the burdens individuals bear might be tenable if 
we assume that the current residents of a state or nation are responsible in 
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some meaningful sense for the aggregate or per capita emissions levels in 
that state or nation.  But where there is substantial mobility across state or 
national lines, and/or where emissions levels in each state or nation are in 
any case a result of historical choices made over several generations, 
this assumption seems untenable.  Thus, the switching cost approach has 
a cosmopolitan, beyond-boundaries, all-in-it-together appeal that regimes 
based on equal emissions reduction percentages do not. 
The switching costs approach also avoids imposing different burdens 
on relatively wealthier states as compared to less wealthy ones—at least 
state GDP or per capita GDP is not an explicit criterion. By avoiding State 
GDP as a factor, the switching costs approach avoids the normatively 
intractable debates about whether there should be distributive justice-
based redistribution from wealthy states to poor ones and how much richer 
countries owe poorer ones and what counts as a rich or poor state.77  In the 
U.S. context, where there is a governance structure that allows for redistribution 
from wealthy to poor regardless of State residence, as for example, in the 
form of all subsidies for low-income households, EPA can avoid distributive 
justice-based calls for greater costs to be borne by wealthy states without 
simply ignoring distributive justice altogether. 
B.  Do the Advantages Apply Outside the U.S.? 
These advantages of the switching costs approach may or may not 
translate onto the international scale, where we are speaking of a group of 
nations rather than a group of states that are part of a federal regime with 
federal constitutional supremacy.  The we-are-all-in-it-together appeal of 
the EPA approach, as well as its implicit reliance on direct aid to individuals 
as a means of addressing distributive justice, might work less well in the 
EU context than in the U.S. context because of the greater sense of distinct 
national identity and legal sovereignty EU member states have vis-à-vis 
the EU, as compared to U.S. states vis-à-vis the U.S. government.  The 
normative appeal of the EPA approach might be even less robust in the 
context of a multilateral agreement involving countries throughout the 
planet. 
However, the switching costs approach may help facilitate agreement 
on the international level, just as it is intended to foster political consensus 
domestically within the United States.  The “break” given nations that face 
large switching costs may make them less hesitant to enter into an 
77. See, e.g., Lisa Friedman & Gayathri Vaidyanathan, All eyes on India in the wake 
of U.S.-China agreement, E&E REP. (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/ 
2015/09/25/stories/1060025351 (noting that India’s Prime Minister Modi’s speech at the United 
Nations focused on what he termed “climate justice”). 
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agreement.  Moreover, under this approach, more is asked of nations that 
tend to have local or domestic politics that make them willing to do more. 
Such nations have already acted in such a way as to create renewable 
infrastructure, and a speedy ramp up in reliance on renewables, this is 
often because these are nations where concern about climate change is the 
greatest, and there is substantial domestic support for concerted action to 
mitigate climate change. 
Another advantage of the EPA approach, and perhaps its greatest, is that 
it encourages the largest emissions reductions where they are cheapest to 
achieve, and in that sense promotes cost-effectiveness and helps contain 
the overall costs of climate change mitigation.  To some extent a cap and 
trade regime, and even more so, a carbon tax regime, would achieve the 
same end of encouraging the biggest bang for the buck (or euro or . . . ) in 
terms of emissions reduction.  The EPA plan envisions some emissions 
trading, which is legally controversial.  To the extent, in the international 
context, neither cap and trade nor a carbon tax are politically feasible, or 
can only be implemented in part, EPA’s equal cost approach could be the 
best available alternative to encourage the most cost-effective climate 
change mitigation. 
C.  Disadvantages of a Switching Costs Approach 
One disadvantage of a switching costs approach is that it is based on 
predicted costs of emissions reductions, and such predictions require a large 
amount of data that might not be accurate.  Indeed, a number of states—
like New Jersey—and industry groups have argued that EPA’s cost 
projections are faulty.  On the other hand, emissions reduction percentage 
regimes of all sorts require an understanding of emissions baselines, and 
as the EU learned, estimates of such baselines require a great deal of 
information and can be inaccurate. In any regime, collecting and analyzing 
the needed data will not be straightforward and will require refinements. 
The more persuasive criticism of the EPA approach is the one leveled 
by New Jersey, as discussed supra:  that it creates perverse incentives by 
potentially assigning states that create clean power infrastructure higher 
emissions reduction targets than states that declined to make such 
investments.  Under the EPA approach, a State might choose not to make 
“voluntary” clean power investments because it would not want EPA to 
respond by imposing upon the State additional emissions reduction obligations 
that may be more than or on a faster and less flexible timetable than the 
State otherwise would adopt on its own.  Of course, as stated, states that 
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are leaders in clean power investments might be exactly those states that, 
as a political matter, are open to strong EPA climate policies and that will 
continue to invest in cleaner power even if it is understood that stricter 
EPA emissions reduction targets will result.  California might be one such 
state.  Political economy and politics in each State vary, thus it is difficult 
to judge the robustness of the perverse incentives argument.  On the 
international front, it may be even more difficult to say whether a switching 
costs approach will lead nations to adopt a strategy of not undertaking 
clean power investments they otherwise would have undertaken. 
However, even if the perverse incentives argument is unpersuasive in 
terms of predicting strategic behavior by states or nations, it has rhetorical 
force, and the rhetorical force can translate into less support for a switching 
costs approach than is needed, politically, for adoption and effective 
implementation.   For that reason alone, it is worth asking how a switching 
costs approach could be configured to mitigate the perverse incentives 
objection to it.  Indeed, we see the shift between the proposed EPA rule and 
the final one as, in part, an effort to do just that. 
D.  Mitigating Perverse Incentives 
One way that any perverse incentives created by the EPA approach can 
be mitigated is by structuring targets so that they reward a state or nation 
by achieving an extent of switching ahead of time of what is required by 
the first round targets. So, for example, assume that in a first round the 
target a nation that has heavily invested in developing solar capacity is 
given a relatively high target because its further ramp up costs for solar 
are relatively low. The nation then ramps up solar even more than required 
to meet its target and creates low-cost opportunities for further reliance on 
renewables.  In setting the round two target, the nation should not be 
penalized for in effect over-enthusiasm, so its round two target should not 
be ramped up to reflect that it now has even lower relative switching costs. 
The nation might nonetheless continue to ramp up renewable production, 
but the fact that it was not required to do so as part of the round two targets 
could be key to avoiding political charges that the regime punished the 
best actors.  By the same token, switching costs may be reduced as a factor 
in second and beyond targets so as to help ensure that the states with 
relatively high switching costs do not intentionally continue to occupy that 
position as a long-term matter. 
Another way to mitigate the perverse incentives implicit in EPA’s 
approach is to use it as only part of what goes into the setting of targets. 
If targets are set so that switching costs is only say a forty or fifty percent 
factor, the extent of any perverse incentives is proportionally reduced. 
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It would seem that EPA, in its final rule, took both these tacks in 
mitigating possible perverse incentives, although EPA did not explicitly 
cite perverse incentives as its motivation.  In the final rule, states that develop 
“early” renewable capacity ahead of what their target would require receive 
a credit they can use against future emission reductions requirements.  
And in the final rule, the imposition of nationwide performance standards 
for coal and natural gas plants in effect reduces the economic advantages 
to states of not seriously considering building up renewable capacity. At 
the international level, it is hard to imagine the imposition of a standard 
floor for performance at coal and gas plants, but there might be shared 
commitments to certain efficiency/performance targets along with aid 
commitments from wealthier countries to poorer ones to help to them 
achieve those kinds of targets.  In fact, that structure—standard or uniform 
commitments to performance coupled with a commitment to aid from 
more technologically-advanced countries to less advanced ones—is found 
in a number of international environmental agreements. 
E.  The Broad View—Many Ways Differentiate 
In any workable international agreement regarding climate change, the 
commitments, obligations and entitlements of nations may need to be 
differentiated in order to achieve agreement and make the agreement 
workable in practice.  The circumstances of all the nations of the world, 
after all, are extremely varied—far more varied than the circumstances of 
the states in the United States.  As one academic commentator recently 
concluded: 
The point is that there will not be one type of differentiation that ‘fits all’ and 
covers all the very different circumstances and situations of parties. It will be the 
right combination or ‘mix’ of substantive commitments, incentive structures, 
entitlements, procedural requirements, etc., which will be crucial for the success 
of a new agreement. A well designed and fine-tuned ‘catalogue’ of options (with 
differing commitments or entitlements) which parties can choose from upon 
signature or ratification might be a feasible way forward, reflecting the diversities 
of a globalized and interconnected world in the sophisticated design of a 
comprehensive agreement.78 
 
 78.  GEIR ULFSTEIN & CHRISTINA VOIGT, RETHINKING THE LEGAL FORM AND PRINCIPLES 
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What the EPA approach to switching costs highlights is one useful way 
to differentiate among participants to a climate change agreement, namely, 
differentiation based on the relative magnitude of switching costs each nation 
faces. In that way, the EPA approach offers guidance for the construction 
of an international accord that was not previously a focus of either 
commentary or an actual international accord. 
90420670900020220691241131090001090791240970251141011190201261140070
73071104073114082&EXT=pdf. 
